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Quest for Emp1re: The Un1ted states versus Germany
 
Part I: 1891 - 1900
 
German battleships threaten American victory at Man'ila! United 
States refuses to acknowledge German rights in Samoa! Germany menaces 
the Western Hemispherel United States reneges on agreement to support 
German stand at Morocco! The age of imperiaIi sm prompted head1ines I" ke 
these in both American and German newspapers at the turn of the century, 
Although little contact took place previously between the two countries, the 
diplomacy which did exist had been friendly in nature. However, when the 
rise of international imperialism during the late 1800s caused both the 
United States and Germany to join the hunt for territories and colonies, the 
resulting competition destroyed their long-standing amicable relationship. 
Because the United States and Germany were latecomers to imperial ism, 
they competed against one another for the few remaining independent 
territories. 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century and the f'irst decade 
of the twentieth century, the United States and Germany battled each other 
for colonial footholds around the world. The two nations expanded during 
the late 1890s into the Pacific and the Far East, areas already colonized by 
Great Britain, France, and Spain. The Spanish-American War and the Samoan 
Affair deepened the rift between the United States and Germany at this 
time. While the fundamental cause of the rift during these incidents was 
their mutual desire to aCQuire land, other factors exacerbated the 
competition. These were Germany's paranoid response to the obvious 
diplomatic reconciliation between the United States and Great Britain, the 
provocation of American suspicion by German rhetoric and German 
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d'iplomatic incompetence, and finally, the blatant ethnic prejudice exhibited 
toward Germany on the part of the United States after the Spanish­
American War. It is also important to point out how the German-American 
rivalry influenced American consideration of the China Market and the 
developing Open Door Policy. Such factors will be proven through the 
detai led analysis of documents which expose the controversial events of the 
1890s. First, however, one should briefly study the historical literature 
relating to the time period, other problems existing between Germany and 
the United States which heightened the imperial ist conflict, and the 
particular American and German goals for empire. 
Journal articles examining the German-American rivalry during the 
Spanish-American War and the Samoan Affair are scarce. Most diplomatic 
history articles deal only with the causes and effects of United States 
imperialism. Similarly, many scholars give opinions on the China Market 
appeal and the Open Door Policy, important elements which will be 
discussed throughout this paper. One article which mentions the German­
American rivalry during the last decade of the nineteenth century is Thomas 
J. McCormick's essay "Insular Possessions for the China Market". This 
article describes the United States' perception of Germany during the 
Spanish-American War. According to McCormick, Germany was the biggest 
threat to American expansion in the Far East. During the Spanish-American 
War, Germany appeared to consider herself heir to Spain's empire in the 
Pacific, and such German expansionism in the Pacific would undoubtedly 
affect the United States' position in the area, thereby 1imiting the United 
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States' access to the China Market.! McCormick supports his argument that 
Germany was a legitimate threat to American interests by citing Germany's 
claims to United States Ambassador Andrew White and Secretary of State 
John Hay in July 1898. German officials informed White and Hay that 
Germany expected "a few coaling stations" and "a naval base" in the 
Philippines, as well as control of the Carolines and greater influence in 
Samoa,2 McCormick asserts that if the United States only took control of 
Manila instead of annexing the Philippine Islands as a whole, Germany surely 
would have attempted to acquire land there. Such German holdings in the 
PI111ippines would have jeopardized American commercial interests in 
China.3 
The United States and Germany experienced difficulties beyond 
imperial ist competition during the final years of the nineteenth century. 
Tariff wars, naval growth, and the Anglo-American rapprochement only 
added to the German-American rivalry rooted in imperialism. 
American and German tariff wars staged during the late nineteenth 
century contributed to the battle for empire by engendering distrust 
between the two nations. Both the Meat Inspection Act and the McKinley 
Tariff damaged German trade; the United States Congress passed both 
measures in 1890, The inspection law particularly hurt Germany by giving 
the president of the United States the authority to bar imports from 
countries Which discriminated against American products; during the late 
1800s, Germany banned American pork for health reasons, a fact which 
lThomasJ. McCormick. "Insular Possessions for the China Market," in Imperial Suroo: The
 
United States Abreact the la90s-Early 1900s ,ed. Thomas G. Paterson and Stephen G. Rabe
 
(LeXington, MA: D.C. Heath and COmpany, 1992),59.
 
2 Ibid.
 
3 Ibid, 159-60.
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-identified the nation as this law's prime target.4 In 1894, the United States 
passed the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, reimpos'ing the sugar duty. This tariff 
strained German-American relations because of its affect on Germany's 
sugar industry, the chief German export to the Uni ted States.5 The tari ff 
war with the United States elicited a strong German reaction. After his 
visit with the Russian tsar in 1896, Kaiser Wilhelm II proposed "the getting 
together of Europe in a battle against McKinley and America in a joint 
defensive tariff alliance .... "0 Although Europe never implemented the 
Kaiser's plan, the statement demonstrates the existing German apprehension 
regarding American economic power. 
Germany began to strengthen its navy during the f'lnal years of the 
nineteenth century, triggering a similar American response. Acquisition of 
overseas territory revealed the need for increased American naval power as 
well; the Philippines and the Samoan Islands required protection from rival 
imperial powers 'like Great Britain and Germany. The powerful British navy 
and the rising German naval force provided one 'Impetus for a rise In 
American naval strength. Another influence upon the United States naval 
policy was Alfred Thayer Mahan's book The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History, published in 1890. According to Mahan, a strong and sizable navy 
should protect American interests overseas wh'ile also preventing any 
European powers from expanding into the Western Hemisphere} During the 
1890s, the United States naval department rapidly constructed fleets 'In 
4 Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany: ADiplomatic History (Ithaca, N.Y.: COrnell
 
University Press, 1984),39.
 
5 Ibid., 40.
 
6 Ibid., 49, ,
 
7Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of Americao Expansionism, 1860-1898
 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963),88-90.
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order to prepare for future naval engagements in both the Gulf of Mexico and 
the Pacific.8 The United States' new fleets were often in confl ict with 
German naval forces; for example, American and German warships faced one 
another during both the 1898 Spanish-American War and the Venezuelan 
crisis of the early 1900s. 
Finally, the Anglo-American rapprochement exacerbated the conflict 
between the United States and Germany. This reconci Iiation directly 
impacted the American and German Quests for colonial empire. In 1895 and 
1896, the Venezuelan border dispute initiated a new era of harmonious 
relations between the United States and Great Britain. The British 
recognized the State Department's claims to moderate the Venezuelan 
crisis, and this action helped to ease longstanding American suspicions 
toward British policies in the Western Hemisphere. Great Britain showed 
respect for the Monroe Doctrine and the ultimate rights of the United States 
in the Western Hemisphere.9 Germany regarded the developing Anglo­
American rapprochement not only as a threat to her own expansionist goals, 
but also as the loss of a strategic ally against France and Great Britain. 
Members of the German diplomatic corps hoped to establish the increasingly 
powerful United States as an ally to Germany; Germany viewed the United 
States as a possible strategic ally because of the nation's proximity to two 
oceans and its potential position as a powerful naval foe to Great Britain. 
German paranoia of the potential Anglo-American all iance caused the nation 
to implement maneuvers which could produce a rift between the United 
States and Great Britain. Such actions only resulted in the further 
alienation of the United States. 
8 Ibid., 122-3.. 
9 Ibid" 106. 
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During the late 1800s) the idea that the United States could expand 
beyond the Western Hemisphere emerged as a dominating influence on the 
nation's foreign policy. The chief aim was to secure foreign markets where 
the United States could sell its surplus goods. A surge in industrial 
production during the nineteenth century was the signal for the United 
States to expand its foreign trade. James G. Blaine) Secretary of State 
under President Benjamin Harrison) articulated the necessity for increased 
foreign trade: "I wish to declare the opinion that the United States has 
reached a point where one of its hJghest duties is to enlarge the area of its 
foreign trade.... Our great demand is expansion,"10 Whi Ie Blaine proposed 
that the United States extend its economic influence chiefly into the Latin 
American sphere) President William McKinley and Secretary of State John 
Hay directed American expansionism toward Asia and the Pacific In hopes of 
grabbing a foothold in the vast markets of China. Their plans called for 
territorial acquisitions in the Pacific to act as either coal ing stations or 
naval bases en route to China. 11 
American exceptional ism and the missionary movement were other 
reasons for imperialism. Pride rooted in the American democratic system 
invoked the obligation to spread the ideas of freedom and l'lberty around the 
world) especially to those peoples who supposedly possessed neither the 
maturity nor the intelligence to learn such principles on their own. Such 
racism was a driving force behind American imperial ism. 12 The increasing 
number of missionaries residing in the Far Eastern territories also 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 11 2. 
12 Michael H. Hunt, "American IdeoIOW: Visions of National Greatness and Racism," in Imperjal 
Surge: The United States Abroad. the la90s-Early 1900s, ed. Thomas G. Paterson and Stephen G. 
Rabe(Lexington,MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1992), 18. 
6 
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influenced United States foreign pol icy. United States po Iicymakers used 
the presence of missionaries in the Far East as an excuse for American 
military and business ventures there; the United States had a duty to 
protect its citizens in the Far East. 
Several historians have researched and written articles on reasons 
for United States expansionism into the Far East. In his article "The 
Importance of Economic Expansion", Thomas G. Paterson argues that the 
expanding American economy was the primary motive behind expansionism. 
While Paterson aCknowledges the other causes of imperial ism, he cites 
several reasons why the need for increased foreign trade triggered the 
movement. First, exports meant profits. Second, foreign trade could result 
in a reduction of the domestic tension caused by overproduction and 
unemployment. Third, increased American foreign trade would lead to 
substantial political influence abroad. Finally, American accession of 
foreign markets would heighten the international prestige of the United 
States. 13 In the aforementioned article "Insular Possessions for the China 
Market", Thomas J. McCormick reinforces Paterson's argument by stressing 
the lure of the China Market. McCormick states, "The insular possessions in 
the Pacific [Hawaii, Guam, Philippines, Samoa] were not pieces of empire, 
per se, but stepping-stones and levers to be utilized upon a larger and more 
important stage -- China."14 
Similar to the United States, economic motives were the basis for 
German expansionism. By the end of the nineteenth century, Germany owned 
some of the strongest industries in Europe. The nation's rising foreign trade 
13 Thomas G. Paterson, "The Importance of Economic Expansion," in Major Problems in American 
foreIgn pollW, Volume I; To 1914. ed. Thomas G. Paterson (LexIngton. MA: D.C. Heath and 
Company. 1989),366. 
14 McCormicK. 67. 
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resulted from its booming economy; during a forty year period, German 
foreign trade increased five times. 1S The German government saw the need 
for larger markets where Germany could sell her goods. Expansionism and 
territorial annexation were the best ways to acquire such foreign markets. 
Kaiser W'ilhelm II indicated another reason why Germany should expand its 
territor-y; expansionism added to German glory and power. The notion of 
German superiority took root soon after the nation's formation in 1871, and 
the idea acted as a catalyst for German imperialism during the 1890s and 
early 1900s. According to the Kaiser, Germany should take its proper place 
in the world by establishing a colonial empire which could compete with the 
empires of Great Britain and France. As early as 1871, the Kaiser addressed 
the issue in a speech to the newly established Colonial Society: "The 
German empire has developed into a world empire, and it is your duty, 
Gentlemen, to help me bind this great empire to the Fatherland.... The time 
of Germany's phllistinism is over when she was oblivious to whatever went 
on in the world. "16 Germany was a latecomer to the international 
community, but she arrived with a vengeance. 
Rivalry between the United States and Germany developed during the 
late 1890s due to their conflicts concerning the Spanish-American War and 
the Samoan Affair. Although the simultaneous search for colonies was the 
main reason for discord, other elements heightened the rivalry, such as 
German diplomatic inconsistency and rhetoric, the widespread American 
prejudice toward Germany, and Germany's paranoid response to the Anglo­
15 Mary Evelyn Townsend. The Rise and Fall of Germany's COlonial Empire, 1884-1918 (New
 
York: The MacMillan COmpany. 1930),176.
 
16 Ibid., 179.
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American reconciliation. By the turn of the century, diplomatic relations 
between the two countries took a decided turn for the worse. 
Spanish-American War (1898) 
Before proving how certain factors exacerbated the growing rift 
between the United States and Germany, it is important to briefly review 
the course of events during the Spanish-American War. Hostilities broke 
out between the United States and Spa'in in the spr'ing of 1898; although the 
chief arena for conflict was Cuba, the United States also challenged Spanish 
interests in the Far East. On May 1, 1898, Commodore George Dewey secured 
victory over the Spanish naval forces 'in Manila Bay, thereby obtain'ing 
contro1of Spanish territory in the Phil ippines. Nations around the world 
viewed the Spanish defeat as a chance to expand the1rlmper1al1nterests in 
the Far East. Several countries sent naval vessels to Manna Bay, including 
Great Britain, France, and Germany. Yet Germany sent a naval force under 
Vice-Admiral Otto von Diederichs which almost doubled the contingents of ' 
the other countries, causing the United States to view Germany as the chief 
threat to its interests in the Philippines. Germany defended its position by 
claiming that German c'itizens in the region needed the protection of the 
German navy, but neither the United States government nor the American 
public believed the rationalization. Under pressure from the American 
diplomatic corps, Germany recalled its last naval vessels from Manila Bay in 
February 1899. The United States began its occupation of the Philippines in 
1898 and estab1ished controlover the terri tory with the defeat of the 
Filipino insurgents in 1901.17 
17 Jonas, 57-9. 
9 
-Inconsistency in German foreign policy caused problems between the 
United States and Germany during the Spanish-American War. Before the 
war began, Germany claimed its neutrality and rejected Spanish requests to 
lntervene during the war. Germany also dispatched a notice to the American 
ambassador in Berlin confirming its neutral status. American Ambassador 
Andrew White relayed the message to the American government on May 5, 
1898: "He [German minister Bernhard von Bulow} said that the Imperial 
Government had been from the first determined to exercise the strictest 
neutrality, .... "18 German newspapers also stressed the importance of 
German noninterference during the war. In April 1898 The New York Tjmes 
printed an excerpt from the Staats-Zeitung, which included an interview 
with an official from the German Foreign Office. According to the Staats­
Zeitung. the German official said, "But, nevertheless, we will interfere 
under no circumstances whatever, .... We sincerely wish to keep up the 
friendship with the United States which has stood the test of a hundred 
years without ever being impaired. "19 German newspapers also indicated 
the German public preference for American Victory over Spain. However, 
German diplomatic inconsistency emerged as the conflict developed. 
German rhetoric and maneuvers contradicted the amicable German front, 
causing the United States to look down upon such inconsistent messages. 
Both the German government and German newspapers demonstrated 
anti-American sentiment before and during the Spanish-American War. In 
fact, Germany's decision to send a fleet to Manila Bay resulted from the 
unsubstantiated report that the Filipinos requested the formation of an 
18 US State Department, "Mr. White to Mr. Day, Berlin, May 5, 1898," in Papers Relatjng to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 
863.
 
19 "The Only Peaceful Way," The New York Times, 10 April 1898,2.
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independent state under a German prince. Germany also viewed the 
Phl1 ippines as a good location for a naval base. Deputy Foreign Minister 
Oswald von Richthofen acted upon this jUdgment when he informed 
Ambassador White that Germany would appreciate a few bases in the 
Phi Iippines.20 The American government perceived such behavior as 
threatening to American interests in the region. German newspapers 
criticized the United States as well. The Berl iner Post reportedly referred 
to the United States as "rapacious" and "pharisaical ".21 When The New 
York Times printed an excerpt from the Deutsche Zeitung which proposed 
that Germany use the Spanish-American War for its own advantage, the 
United States understandably responded in anger and indignation, The 
Zeitung suggested: 
Appropriate Samoa. drive out the Americans from there and take 
possession of one or more of the Antilles, if possible the Danish 
Islands, as Germany, after Cuba has become American or independent, 
w111 require a coal ing station in those waters for her navy and 
merchant marines.22 
The United States considered the suggestion to be a threat to American 
expansion. German rhetoric influenced American poIicy to some extent after 
the Spanish-American War. One possible reason for the American decision 
to take over the Ph1lippines in 1899 was to prevent any German acquisitions 
in the area. If the United States controlled all Philippine territory, Germany 
would have no chance to claim any land or resources there. 
The presence of German warships at Manila Bay precipitated an 
onslaught of anti-German public opinion in the United States, Eventually, 
20 Jon8S. 57-8.
 
21 "Germany Veers Around." The New York Times. 1May 1898 J 4.
 
22 "The Only Peoceful Way," 2,
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such anti-German sentiments developed into blatant prejudice on the part of 
the United States, as seen in the newspaper publications of the time. The 
New york Times once made the accusation that Germany helped Spain 
maintain control over the Philippines, This same article also asserted the 
possib'll ity that Germany armed "the Phlllppineinsurgents with a view to 
harrass the American army at Man'ila."23 In July 1898, The New york Times 
expressed the widespread American frustration regarding the German 
presence in the Phil ippines. The Tjmes asked, "Why is it that the Germans 
do these things? What is it that they expect to gain by doing them?,,24 A 
June 1898 New York Times article gave another example of the growing 
prejudice. The article 'illustrated the anger and suspicion Americans 
directed toward Germany: 
There can be no doubt of the unofficial American view of the 
assemblage of a German squadron in Manila Bay. It is that that 
assemblage is unmannerly and provocative, and that It is meant not to 
protect existing German interests but to find new interests to 
protect. It is engaged, that is to say, in 'preempting a claim', The 
behavior of Germany in the Far East indicates that she is no more 
particular about her pretext than was the wolf in the fable. The next 
Question is whether she takes us for a lamb.25 
The Spanish-American War emerged as the first imperialist confl iet during 
WhiCh American publiC opinion was clearly anti-German. Future strife 
between the two nations revealed even greater American suspicion. 
After the Spanish-American War, the United States claimed the 
Philippine Islands as American territory. The acquisition of the Phllippines 
proved to be a consequential step toward easier American access to the 
23" Germany Is Not Interferlng," The New York Tlmes, 25 september 1898, 3. 
24 "Germany and the Philippines," The New york Times. 18 July 1898.6. 
25 "German Ships-of-War at Manila." The New York Times, 30 June 1898.6, 
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China Market. The Philippines served not only as a location for an American 
naval base, but also as a fueling station spot for ships en route to China. 
The impending access to the China Market sparked the formulation of the 
Open Door Policy, which was established in 1899. The Spanish-American 
War also had a long-lasting impact on the American public opinion of 
Germany. The war engendered a suspicion of German motives and maneuvers 
which would endure for the next ten to twenty years. 
Samoa (1898-1899) 
The United States and Germany battled for control over the Samoan 
Islands during the final years of the nineteenth century. By the 1890s, 
Great Britain, Germany, and the United St~tes each had substantial claim in 
the Samoan region. Tension between the three nations resulted from 
differing opinions on the question of kingship succession, and from the 
armed hostilities which broke out in 1899. Conflict concerning the islands 
began when King Malletoa died on August 22, 1898. Ma1ietoa's death 
occurred when the return of opposition tribal chief Mataafa was imminent; 
Great Britain, Germany, and the United States eXiled Mataafa to the Marshall 
Islands years before. In July 1898, the British consul in Samoa telegraphed 
that Mataafa's return should be delayed dlJe to Ma1ietoa's impending death. 
Although the consul believed that the three powers should choose the 
successor to the kingship rather than allowing the natives to elect their 
own king, the British official sti 11 feared Mataafa's impact upon Samoan 
natives. The British pondered whether the natives would advocate Mataafa 
as king, astrong leader who would not act in accordance w1th British 
13
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policy.26 In contrast, Germany sLipported Mataafa's claim to the throne. 
Once the Germans suspected that Malietoa Tanu, the other contender for the 
throne, was fixed securely within the British sphere of interest, German 
officials began to inttiate operations to establish Mataafa's power. On 
September 19, 1898, Mataafa returned to Samoa.27 At first, the United 
States remained indifferent to the kingship question, stressing the natives' 
right to elect their own king. However, the American position gradually 
moved toward the British side as the conflict progressed.28 
On New Year's Eve, 1898, the American chief justice of Samoa, 
William Chambers, proclaimed Mataafa to be an invalid candidate for the 
throne because the tripartite government previously banned him from the 
kingship in 1889. In fact, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck requested 
the exile, although Germany obviously changed its posttion on the issue 
during the decade. Chambers subsequently named Malietoa Tanu as king of 
Samoa. Both the Germans and the supporters of Mataafa reacted angri ly to 
the proclamation, and they began preparations for war. Hostilities broke out 
the next day; Mataafans fought Malietoans, and British and American 
officials sought cover in their respective warships.29 
The United States responded to the Samoan vio lence in March by 
sending the USS philadelphja to Samoa under the command of Rear-Admiral 
Albert Kautz. The Germans and Mataafans objected to the patriotic bluster 
of Kautz, as well as his public rejection of the provisional government 
26 US State Department, "Samoan Affairs, n in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901),607.
 
27 Paul M. KennErly, The samoan Tangle: AStuW in Anglo-American Relations. 1878-1900
 
(Ireland: Irish University Press, 1974), 147.
 
28 US State Department, "samoan Affairs, n 607-8.
 
29 Kennedy, 150-2.
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formed after the January host iIi ties. When the Mataafan rebels attempted 
to occupy a strategic territorial point, Kautz opened fire on several nearby 
Mataafan vessels, wh'lle the British Porpoise acted similarly against native 
villages. Mataafan rebels responded by attacking the Apia township, the 
British consulate, and the American consulate. Hostilities continued 
throughout the next month. The need for an international commission was 
obvious by May 1899; such a commission was necessary to resolve the 
disputes in Samoa. Commissioners chosen were: Baron Speck von SternbLlrg 
(counselor of the German embassy at Washington), Mr. C.N.B. Eliot (second 
secretary of the British embassy at Washington), and Mr. Bartlett Tripp (a 
former American minister at Vienna). The commissioners developed a 
report and possible solution over the summer. They envisioned a similarly 
structured government, with the goal to prevent the acquisition of 
disproportionate power by a certain nation. The commission also upheld 
chief justice Chambers' decision regarding the kingship question; Malietoa 
Tanu remained the rightful Samoan k'ing.30 
On December 2, 1899, the Samoan affair resulted in the partition of 
the islands between the United States and Germany. The agreement stated 
that the Germans would control the islands of Upolu and Savaii, wh'lle the 
United States would govern Tutuila, including Pago Pago harbor. In return 
for British relinquishment of its claims in Samoa, Germany transferred 
control of some territory in the Pacific and in Africa to the British.31 
German aggressive maneuvers, diplomatic inconsistency, and 
nationalistic rhetoric during the Samoan Affair contributed to the grOWing 
German-American rivalry. The greatest affront to the American conscience 
30 Ibid., 152-3, 169, 173, 176-7.
 
31 "samoa Treaty Is Signed," The New York T1mes, 3 December 1899,3.
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was the German initiation of hostilities in January 1899; as 
aforementioned, the January violence constituted a direct retaliation to the 
chief justice determination that Mataafa was an invalid candidate for the 
Samoan kingship. Considering the chief justice was an American, the 
German reaction angered American officials because of its evident 
disrespect for American policy and jUdgment. On January 6, 1899, the 
Germans locked the door of the capital courthouse and declared the 
courthouse to be closed until notification from the new provisional 
government, which Germany established after American and British 
officials withdrew to their ships. This action effectively cut off both the 
Americans and the British from Samoan affairs. On January 7, Chambers and 
the British reclaimed their influence by forcing the German officials from 
the courthouse and breaking into the building itself. The German 
representative to Samoa displayed even more presumptuous German 
behavior. According to historian Paul Kennedy, Raffel assumed a dictatorial 
attitude toward other international officials during the Samoan Affair, 
although his sudden assumption of this absolutist power may have resulted 
from his development of mental illness. He even proclaimed himself to be 
the new chief justice during the January hostilities. Raffel's behavior 
during the incident only further frustrated American officials.32 Germany's 
appointment of Baron Speck von Sternburg is an example of contradiction in 
German diplomacy. In contrast to Germany's previous hostile actions, 
Germany decided in the late spring and early summer of 1899 to name 
Sternburg as the German representative to the international Samoan 
commission. This action was an attempt by Germany to secure the peace 
32 Kennedy I 149- 152. 
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and friendship of the United States. SternbLirg was stationed previously in 
the United States, where he became friends with politician Theodore 
Roosevelt and married an American woman.33 Such variance in German 
diplomatic tone and actions only verified the American refusal to cooperate 
with German officials. 
German diplomatic rhetoric also provoked American suspicion. 
Speeches by German officials often contradicted such friendly gestures as 
the appointment of Sternburg as Samoan commissioner. On March 1, 1899, 
the German secretary of state for foreign affairs declared, "I hold strongly 
to the hope that we (the three treaty powers) shall succeed in disposing 
also of these latest troubles in Samoa, with due protection for German 
rights and interests .... "34 The German secretary Bernhard von Bulow 
clearly indicated the German priority during the Samoan crisis. The United 
States perceived Bulow's speech as a sign that Germany placed its own 
interests and power above a peaceful coexistence with the United States. 
Germany also demonstrated anger at the actions of American Admiral Kautz 
during March 1899. A national newspaper in Germany published the 
following JUdgment: 
It must remain undecided for the present whether Admiral Kautz has 
assalled the honor of the German flag. If this should prove to have 
case, we have the fullest confidence in the ability of the 
Government ... to secure adequate satisfaction for the moral interest 
of the German Empire.35 
Although the German reaction to the American attack on the Mataafan rebels 
in March was Justifiable, the threat to protect the interests of the German 
33 Jonas, 61-2.
 
34" Germany's Foreign Policy," The New York Times, 1March 1899, 7.
 
35 "Germany Not Yet Appeased," The New York Times, 10 April 1899.7.
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empire instantly jeopardized the German relationship with the United 
States. 
Attempts made by Germany during the Samoan Affair to divide Great 
Britain and the United States demonstrated the growing German paranoia 
regarding the Anglo-American reconciliation. Such German action backflred 
and resulted in the alienation of the United States and the wrath of Great 
Britain. One example took place in January 1899. In a New York Times 
article pUblished in March, German consul Rose contested that the British 
attempted to forcibly prevent the rise of Mataafa as the king of Samoa. This 
action denied the rights of the natives to choose their own king; according 
to Rose, the majority of Samoan natives preferred Mataafa as king. Rose 
hoped that the United States would look down upon such a rejection of free 
choice and free national election, but the United States still chose to 
support Great Britain.36 Another force which helped to sway American 
public opinion toward Great Britain was widespread anti-German British 
sentiment. Several German actions, including German attempts to alienate 
the United States from G~eat Brita in, caused vehement ant i-German pUb1ic 
opinion in the British nation. One British correspondent stated: 
The Germans tried their utmost to make the natives attack the British 
ConSUlate and the mission house where the Consul was giving refuge 
to British subjects. It was only respect and fear for the British flag 
that held the nat ives back. The Germans toId the natives to kill all 
the English missionaries and to sweep the 'pigs of English' into the 
sea. The lootIng was terrible. Twenty houses were utterly wrecked, 
the houses destroyed, and the Villagers left destitute.37 
36"Rose's Samoa Dispatches," The New York Times, 11 March 1899, 1. 
37 "The Germans InSamoa," The New York. T'imes, 1March 1899, 7. 
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Such accusations undoubtedly strengthened already established American 
suspicions of Germany. 
Once again, the most obvious result of the Samoan Affair was the 
reaffirmation of the China Market appeal. Naval bases and coaling stations 
were the best means to establish a trade route to China. The American 
commission representative Tripp acknowledged that Pago Pago harbor would 
be an excellent site for a naval base due to its strategic geographical 
location. Tripp contended: 
In short, the whole island must be had; and it would, in my judgment 
be a wise policy to give out allies and the world to be informed that 
our interests in Samoa center mostly about Pago-Pago and the 
island of Tutu'ila, and that we should not look withe favor upon any 
effort on the part of any nation to interfere with our rights or make 
them less available for future requirements of the nation by 
curtailment of our interests in the harbor or in the Island itself.38 
The United States claimed and protected its territory in the Samoa region 
due to its importance as a stepping-stone to China. The reaffirmation of th.e 
China Market appeal only indicated the need for a policy protecting American 
interests and trade in China. 
German-Amerlcan rlvalry reached a boning point prior to the turn of 
the century. The Spanish-American War and the Samoan Affair revealed the 
problems resulting from German-American imperialist competition. One 
consequence of late 1890s imperialism was the strengthening of the Anglo­
American rapprochement. When the United States realized that Germany 
was a powerful competitor for territories in the Far East, the United States 
38 US State Department. "samoan Affairs," 662. 
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continued its reconciliation with Great Britain. This Anglo-American 
reconciliation only resulted in the further alienation of Germany. Another 
result of the Spanish-American War and the Samoan Affair was the 
establishment of anti-German sentiment in the United States. Such 
prejudice would damage German-American foreign relations in the future) 
because Americans would assume automatically that Germany committed 
grievances against the United States. 
Imperial ism in the 1890s significantly influenced American foreign 
policy as well. Americans feared that a lack of access to the China market 
would inflict damage upon the American economy. During the Spanish­
American War and the Samoan Affair) Germany emerged as a major threat to 
American trade and sales in China. The United States attempted to ensure 
its access to the vast markets of China with the development and dispersal 
of the Open Door Policy. This policy became an important ingredient of 
American diplomacy in 1899) when Secretary of State John Hay issued the 
first Open Door note on September 6. The note requested that the world 
powers acknowledge the principle of free trade in China.39 Hay released the 
second Open Door note on July 3) 1900. Issued during the Boxer Rebellion) 
this second note urged nations to respect China's territorialintegrity.40 
United States officials feared that a partitioned China would harm the 
United States' free trade) prevent American access to the large foreign 
market) and jeopardize other American interests in China. The Open Door 
39 John Hay, "The Open Door Note, 1899,"1n Major problems in American Foreign policy.
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Policy also affected German-American relations during the early years of 
the twentieth century. 
Imperialist competition during the late 1890s marred the amicable 
relationship between the United States and Germany. The simultaneous hunt 
for colonies in the Far East initiated a rivalry between the two countries. 
The emerging Anglo-American rapprochement, German d'iplomatic 
inconsistency and rhetoric, and the intensification of American prejudice 
toward Germany all exacerbated the German-American rivalry. Similar 
factors continued to damage the German-American relationship after the 
turn of century. The Venezuelan crisis, the Russo-Japanese War, and the 
Moroccan/Algeciras incident eventually destroyed any chance for the two 
countries to maintain their diplomatic friendsh'ip. 
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ouest tor f:mplre: rne Unltea ~tates versus bermany 
Part II: 1901 - 191 0 
Imperial ism took the world by storm during the late 1800s and early 
1900s. The nations of Europe searched the world for colonies which they 
could exploit for raw materials and use as markets to sell their goods. 
Great Britain and France established colonial emp'lres by the turn of the 
century, while both the United States and Germany hoped to compete by 
finding new land and population areas to conquer. When the two nations 
expanded their influence worldwide, their interests came into conflict with 
one another, and they competed over the few remain'lng areas to colonize. 
After the Spanish-American War and the Samoan Partition of the late 
1890s, friction continued to build between the United States and Germany. 
Several factors exacerbated imperialist competition between these two 
nations, namely American prejudice toward Germany, a lack of 
comprehension and respect for the two countries' dramatically opposite 
political structures and diplomatic styles, and the German paranoia 
regarding the developing Anglo-American rapprochement. Such causes of 
imperialist competition can be proven through the study of the Venezuelan 
Crisis of 1902-1903, the 'involvement of both nations in the Russo-Japanese 
War, and the Moroccan/Algeciras incident. These episodes shaped the 
critical American policies of the Roosevelt Corollary and the Open Door, 
while also securing the world balance of power system. leading directly to 
World War I. 
A primary source of conflict between the United States and Germany 
stemmed from the prejudice which the United States exhibited toward the 
German nation. German initiatives during the Spanish-American War 
destroyed the peaceful relations between the two countries and accounted 
• 
for future American suspicion of German motives. After the United States 
navy eliminated Spanish control of the Phllippines in a decisive batt.le under 
Admiral Dewey at Manila In 1898, the Germans saw the opportunity to 
acquire land in the Far East. After refusing to recognize American interests 
in the area, Kaiser Wilhelm II dispatched a fleet to the Manila area under 
Vice-Admiral Otto von Diederichs. Americans viewed the move as a 
deliberate attempt to thwart the interests of the United States in the 
Pacific. 1 Politician William Roscoe Thayer later described the incident's 
long-term effect upon American public opinion. During the first decade of 
the twentieth century, Americans only saw Ita Germany whose contempt for 
American rights ... dated back to von Diederichs' rude and unwelcomed 
arrival alongside Dewey's squadron in Manila Bay in 1898. "2 
German rhetori cal so contributed to Ameri can fears. Kaiser Wi 1he1m 
stressed German superiority and German rights in a speech to his troops 
during the Boxer Rebellion. The Kaiser's adamant approval of German force 
undoubtedly frightened the Americans. The Kaiser stressed: 
You will give no quarter! You will take no prisoners! Whoever falls 
'into your hands will be your victim! Just as the Huns under their K'ing 
Attila made a name for themselves a thousand years ago which still, 
in saga and tradition, makes them appear powerful, so may the name 
German be impressed by you on China for a thousand years, that no 
Chinese will ever dare again look askance at a German.3 
Such a speech only reinforced the suspicions and stereotypes which most 
Americans held toward Germany; for instance, one stereotype might 
1Manfred Jonos, The United states and Germany: ADiplomatic History (Ith6C8, NY: Cornell University
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describe Germans as aggressive. arrogant individuals who had little concern 
for the rights of other nationalities. but rath~r only looked toward the 
future glory of the Fatherland. In 1901 several rumors spread about 
potential German land grabs in the Western Hemisphere. For example. 
Americans talked about the German aspiration to bUy land in Lower 
California or to purchase the Danish West Indies.4 Such rumors obviously 
concerned both the American pubIic and government because of the veiled 
threat to the Monroe Doctrine and the United States itself. 
Not only did widespread anti-German sentiment in the United States 
cause problems between the two nations. but their mutual disrespect for 
the other's political system and diplomatic methodology also perpetuated 
difficulties in foreign relations. The United States was a democracy. while 
Germany was an autocracy. and neither country could comprehend the basis 
for the opposite political structure. Germany did not understand the 
importance of individual rights to the United States. while Americans could 
not appreciate the German compulsion to serve and glorify the kaiser and 
the Fatherland. German newspapers also often criticized the Monroe 
Doctrine. a longstanding and integral component of United States foreign 
policy.S Another policy which Germany misinterpreted was the Open Door 
Policy. The German government understandably believed that the Open Door 
Pol icy appl ied to all areas of the world. while the United States asserted 
that the policy only pertained to China. Just as the two nations' political 
structures did not complement one another. neither did their leaders. 
President Theodore Roosevelt often looked down upon Kaiser Wilhelm II's 
impulsiveness. unreliability. and lack of diplomatic finesse. Roosevelt's 
4 Ibid., 68. 
5 Parsons, 449. 
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message to the French ambassador in June 1905 indicates his lack of 
respect for the German kaiser: "What is needed is to give some satisfaction 
to the immeasurable vanity of William II .... "6 Unfortunately, the kaiser's 
ineptitude in foreign affairs appeared to influence the German diplomatic 
staff as a whole during the first decade of the twentieth century, 
generating even more frustration in the United States. 
A final reason for conflict between the United States and Germany 
was the developing Anglo-American rapprochement and Germany's paranoid 
response to it. As already explained in the first section of this paper, the 
Venezuelan border dispute of 1895-1896 initiated a new era of harmonious 
relations between the United States and Great Britain. As American and 
British interests appeared to coincide more, Germany's fear of the 
developing Anglo-American alliance grew. Germany considered the Anglo­
American rapprochement to be a threat to its own expansionist goals and to 
be the loss of a strategic ally against France and Great Britain. Members of 
the German diplomatic corps hoped to establish the increasingly powerful 
United States as an ally to the German nation. German paranoia of the 
potential Anglo-American alliance caused the nation to act in ways which 
might cause problems between the United States and Great Britain. Such 
actions only resulted in the further alienation of the United States from 
Germany. 
Venezuela (1902-1903) 
Venezuela marked the arena for the first imperialist conflict between 
the United States and Germany during the twentieth century. Before 
6Raymond A. Esthus, Thwre Roosevelt and the In1ermrtlonal R1valr1es (Waltham, MA: G1nn-Bla1sdell, A 
Xerox Company, 1970),78. 
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analyzing the motives and reasons for the crisis, it is necessary to 
summarize the course of events in 1902 and 1903. During the ongoing 
Venezuelan Civil War, both Germany and Great Britain loaned vast sums of 
currency to the Venezuelan government; however, by 1902, Venezuela still 
had not repaid these loans. Germany also complained about acts of violence 
committed against German nationals residing in Venezuela, as well as the 
destruction of German property. On December 7, 1902, both Germany and 
Great Britain dispatched ultimatums to the Venezuelan government 
requesting the immediate compensation of claims. Along with Italy, the 
two countries established a peaceful blockade around the Venezuelan 
border.8 In response, the United States sent a fleet to the Carribean under 
the command of Admiral Dewey. 
The first incident which provoked controversy was the destruction of two 
Venezuelan vessels by a German warship on December 9. The United States 
arranged for arbitration proceedings fOllowing this event, and both Germany and 
Great Britain agreed to arbitration before the Hague Court by the end of the month. 
In late January 1903, while the arbitration proceedings were underway, a German 
warship leveled a Venezuelan fort; in addition, Germany demanded $325,000 in 
immediate compensation for her claims, in contrast to the initial claims of Great 
Britain, which amounted to $27,500.9 Despite the controversy which followed 
these German initiatives, the arbitration protocols were signed on February 13, 
1903, resolving the matter with Venezuela's agreement to repay the European 
loans. tO 
8 Richard H. Collin, Theodore Roosevelt's carrlbean: The Panama canal, the Monroe Doctrine. and the
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Previously established American suspicions of Germany escalated the 
Venezuelan conflict. The American public overreacted to the German initiatives in 
the Carribean by assuming that Germany planned to use this opportunity to seize 
territory in the Western Hemisphere, even though Germany pointed out on several 
occasions that the German intention was not to acquire land, but simply to receive 
compensation for German losses during the Venezuelan Civil War. German 
Ambassador Theodor von Holleben stated, "... We declare especially that under no 
circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or permanent 
occupation of Venezuelan territory. "11 However, the United States refused to 
bel ieve such pronouncements by German officials because of the preconceived 
notion that the German goal was to ruthlessly expand around the world no matter 
what the cost to other peoples. 
American newspapers of the time revealed the ethnic prejudice directed 
toward the Germans on the part of the American public. On December 12, 1902, 
The New YQrUimes reacted tQ the destructiQn Qf Venezuelan vessels by German 
warships. The Times commented on the lack of civilized qualities which SUCh, an 
act demonstrated: 
It can hardly be denied that they [the Germans] went beyQnd thQse prQper 
limits when they actually seized and destrQyed armed vessels belQnging tQ 
the GQvernment Qf Venezuela. That act is fairly cQmparable tQ acts Qf 
wantQn devastatiQn in warfare, which have IQng been discQuntenanced by 
civ'llized natiQns. 12 
The Times referred Qften tQ the recurrence Qf German barbarism and the lack Qf 
,German diplomatic finesse in articles appearing from December 1902 to February 
1903. Several articles indicated the American suspiciQn Qf the Berlin Foreign 
11 Jonas, 69.
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Offj~~: Th~ ~QjtQr1a15 a15Q Q~D1~t~Q th~ Am~r1can reliance on peace with Great 
Britain, as well as American respect for British policies. For example, The Times 
referred to "the friendship of our nearer kin" which would hopefully guide the 
Germans to a more appropriate course of action. The editorial continued: "That 
Germany would persist in ravaging the coast of the Venezuelans after Great 
Britain had discarded that method for a more civilized procedure is incredible. "13 
The United States proceeded to express anger toward German policy throughout the 
affair. 
A variation in foreign policy which only added to the Venezuelan controversy 
involved opposing German and American opinions regarding the validity of the 
Monroe Doctrine. The New york Times often reaffirmed the American belief in the 
absolute virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, a policy which the United States advocated 
for over 75 years. Any attempt by the Germans to seize territory in the Western 
Hemisphere would constitute a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, 
during the Venezuelan crisis, the United States considered the destruction of 
Venezuelan vessels by Germany to be an infringement of the policy. In addition to 
this American position, several German newspapers spoke out against the Monroe 
Doctrine at the time. "The semi-official paper, the Tagl1che Rundschau, asserted 
that 'the insolence of the United States ... is ... simply unbearable.' The old 
Bismarckian Hamburger Nachrichten derided it as 'a piece of incredible 
impertinence.'''14 Conflicting opinions concerning the Monroe Doctrine, and later 
the Roosevelt Corollary, only deepened the German-American rift. The Roosevelt 
Corollary was one of the results of the Venezuelan Controversy. Developed in 
1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt, this new policy advocated the right of the 
United States to police the Western Hemisphere. Such a policy would give the 
13 "A Pacific settlement," The New York Times, 16 December 1902, 1. 
14 Parsons, 451. 
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United States the right to defend Venezuela from the European blockade; it also 
provided the United States with another means of protesting European intervention 
in the Western Hemisphere. The Roosevelt Corollary emerged as another 
significant American foreign policy in future years. 
The Venezuelan crisis also demonstrated the German effort to weaken the 
Anglo-American rapprochement. Germany hoped to undermine the link between the 
two English-speaking nations by blaming Great Britain for the institution of a 
warlike blockade. On December 14, 1902, the American ambassador to Germany, 
Charlemagne Tower, cabled a telegram to the United States Secretary of State 
John Hay. The telegram stated that ..... Germany was at first inclined to a pacific 
blockade, but that Great Britain insisted on establishing a warl ike blockade. 
Consequently Germany has yielded to the wishes of Great Britain .... "15 Germany 
and Great Britain announced that a warlike blockade encircled the Venezuelan 
border on December 20. 16 In the December 14 telegram, Germany hoped to convince 
the United States that Great Britain violated the Monroe Doctrine rather than 
Germany itself. This action was an unsuccessful attempt by the Germans to 
alleviate American suspicion of Germany, as well as to create anti-British tension 
and ill feeling amongst the Ame~ican diplomatic corps. Another motive for such 
German action was the realization that the Anglo-German unified front against 
Venezuela was on shaky ground. British public opinion against Germany climaxed 
at this time, as demonstrated by Rudyard Kipling's anti-German poem. The New 
york Times published the poem, further influencing the negative American 
15 US State Department, .. D1ff1culty w1th Venezuela grow1ng out of nonpayment of cla1ms .... ", Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1906).421. 
16 Ib1d., 425. 
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est1mat1on of Germany. K1pl1ng's poem cr1t1c1zed the Anglo-German 1nformal 
alliance, reading as follows: 
Of evil times that men could choose/On evil fate to fall.! 
What brooding jUdgment let ye loose/To pick the worst of all;! 
In sight of peace from the narrow seas/O'er half the world to run/ 
With a cheated crew to league anew/With the Goth and the shamel~ss Hun. 17 
Such rhetoric undoubtedly strengthened the American preference to side with 
Great Britain, while simultaneously provoking even more anti-German sentiment in 
the United States. 
Historians throughout the twent1eth century argued about a part icular facet 
of the Venezuelan cris1s, namely whether President Roosevelt threatened the 
German ambassador that the Un1ted States would use force to prevent German 
1ntervention in the Western Hemisphere. Historian Richard H. Collin calls the 
incident "one of the most controversial episodes in modern diplomatic history. "18 
About fifteen years after the crisis itself, Roosevelt asserted that he issued an 
ultimatum to Germany in mid-December 1902 wh1ch inevitably forced Germany to 
yield to arbitration. However, historians such as Alfred Vagts and Dexter Perkins 
point out that no evidence about such an exchange exists. Vagts and Perkins 
contend that Roosevelt's declaration was an attempt to embarrass President 
Woodrow Wilson and to convince him to declare war on Germany. Since Roosevelt 
had no Qualms about bUllying Germany during the Venezuelan incident, than neither 
should Wilson exhibit acquiescence toward German aggression during World War 
1. 19 
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In contrast, Edward B. Parsons defends Roosevelt's claim in his article "The 
German-American Crisis of 1902-1903. n Parsons cites the readiness of the 
United States naval force in the Carribean as an example of Roosevelt's 
willingness to use force to defend Venezuela. He also describes the animosity 
displayed toward Germans in American editorials as reinforcement for Roosevelt's 
ultimatum. A final reason to believe Roosevelt's ultimatum results from the 
apparent German rejection of the Monroe Doctrine as a viable policy; as 
aforementioned, several German newspapers condemned the Monroe Doctrine during 
the Venezuelan affair.20 Since Germany blatantly refused to comply with the 
Monroe Doctrine, the United States should possess the right to defend its policy 
with force. Whether Roosevelt actually told the German ambassador that the 
United States would force Germany to withdraw from the Carribean unless the 
nation submitted the case to arbitration will remain a mystery. However, the 
issue is interesting enough to provoke ample historical debate over the past 75 
years. 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) 
Russia and Japan engaged in a war over territories located in the Far East 
during the years 1904 and 1905; because the hostilities' occurred in the vicinity 
of China, several nations took a vital interest in the war. Both the United States 
and Germany acted as wartime mediators, although each nation had its own set of 
objectives regarding the war's outcome. The German-American cooperation during 
the Russo-Japanese War created the illusion that the two countries overcame 
their differences and could work amicably together. However, the illusion proved 
false the following year, when the Moroccan/Algeclras incident caused the final 
20 Ibid., 445-50. 
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disintegration of amicable foreign relations between the United States and 
Germany. The cooperation between the two countries during the war sti 11 
persuaded the German diplomatic corps to perceive the United States as an ally, a 
notion which dramatically influenced German foreign policy during the Moroccan 
crisis. The involvement of both nations in the Russo-Japanese War contr'ibuted to 
their escalating rivalry through the lack of respective political and diplomatic 
understanding and by the German attempts to divide the United States and Great 
Britain. 
American and German goals for the resolution of the Russo-Japanese War 
differed from the onset of the conflict. The United States had two fundamental 
concerns regarding the war. First, the United States wanted to maintain China's 
neutrality and territorial integrity. Second, the Americans stressed a continued 
balance of power in the Far East, where no nation would dominate the region. 
Germany strongly supported Russia during the conflict in the hopes that a 
victorious Russia would choose to concentrate upon its territorial gains in the Far 
East rather than in the Balkans, where German interests predominated. The 
territorial integrity and neutrality of China was also a concern to Germany. The 
nation hoped to sustain free trade for all countries throughout the war.21 In early 
February 1904, German Ambassador Speck von SternbLirg consented to the 
American request to reiterate the Open Door Policy in China. Secretary of State 
John Hay dispatched a message to the great world powers, asking them to respect 
China's neutrality and territorial integrity.22 The China issue emerged as the only 
point of agreement between the United States and Germany during the Russo­
Japanese War, and it is still important to note that the German allegiance to such 
21 Jonas, 73-4.
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a principle remained debatable. Considering former German responses to the 
Chinese, it seems unusual that the nation would seek to protect China's territorial 
integrity. Just four years prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Germany condemned 
the Chinese during the Boxer Rebellion. The exclamation by Kaiser W'ilhelm II 
already provided in this paper once again should be used to prove the point. In a 
speech to the German troops in 1900, Kaiser Wilhelm adamantly encouraged his 
armies to suppress the Chinese revolutionaries. He desired that "the name German 
be impressed by you on China for a thousand years, that no Chinese will ever dare 
again look askance at a German. "23 The sudden reversal In German policy toward 
China possibly demonstrated the new German goal to secure an alliance with the 
United States, acknowledging the importance which the United States placed upon 
the Open Door Policy. 
One must study the sequence of events during the Russo-Japanese War 
before attempting to analyze the ways in which the war contr'ibuted to the ongoing 
imperialist rivalry between the United States and Germany. The presence of 
Russian troops in Manchuria was the chief reason for the outbreak of war between 
Russia and Japan, along with the widespread Japanese belief that Russian 
territorial ambitions in the Far East presented a threat to the security of the 
Japanese homeland. The war commenced in February 1904, when Japan attacked 
Russian naval forces at Port Arthur. To the surprise of Western civilization, the 
Japanese won several battles during the first year of the war. The Russians 
surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese in January 1905; two months later, the 
Russians lost approximately 97,000 men in the Battle of Mukden. By the spring and 
early summer of 1905, Western nations includIng the United States hoped to see a 
conclusion to the war before Japan emerged as the major power in the Far East. 
23 Jonas. 63. 
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Japan reached the limits of its mllitary strength and resources in 1905, and the 
nation requested President Theodore Roosevelt to negotiate a peace treaty for 
Japan and Russia. After much deliberation, Japan and Russia signed the Treaty of 
Portsmouth on September 5, 1905. The treaty allowed for the Japanese occupation 
of Southern Sakhalin Island and also cancelled any compUlsory Russian monetary 
payments due Japan.24 Throughout the Russo-Japanese War, Germany initiated 
gestures of peace toward the United States in the hopes of establishing an alliance 
between the two nations; it proved unfortunate for Germany that neither President 
Roosevelt nor the American public ever seriously considered such an alliance. 
Political and leadership differences continued to exacerbate the already 
established rift between the United States and Germany. Germany did not 
interpret the diplomacy of President Roosevelt correctly, perceiving certain 
actions on the part of the United States to be gestures of international friendship. 
In contrast to the widespread belief held by the German diplomatic corps, 
Roosevelt did not contemplate a German-American alliance. Instead, Roosevelt 
used friendly German initiatives to the advantage of the United States and for the 
preservation of the balance of power in the Far East. 
Hopeful, yet gullible German officials misinterpreted certain American 
gestures during the war. When Secretary of State John Hay requested that 
Germany reiterate its compliance with the Open Door Policy in China, Germany 
responded as though the United States had initiated a new era of peaceful 
diplomacy between the two nations. Germany jumped at the chance to cooperate 
with the United States on this issue, as indicated by the message from the 
American ambassador in Berlin to John Hay on February 9, 1904: 
24 Esthus, 27-36. 
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He [the German mInIster for foreIgn affaIrs] saId further that the German 
government sympathIzes fUlly wIth the purpose or the United States 
on behalf of humanIty, the protectIon of foreigners In ChIna, the 
maintenance of order, and the safeguarding of the commerce of the 
world. He added that ... the German government is prepared to act in 
harmony with the United States ....25 
The letter which German Ambassador Sternburg sent to President Roosevelt two 
weeks later again demonstrated the German anticIpation for del"iberations with 
the United States. Sternburg wrote, "I am looking forward wIth great JoY to a talk 
with you over the events In the Far East. The Russian disasters there seem almost 
as pItifUl as those of SpaIn in your war."26 Another dIplomatic effort falsely 
interpreted by Germany took place when Roosevelt Informed Sternburg about his 
plan for a peace settlement to the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt's proposed 
peace settlement included Japanese control of Korea and the establishment of 
Manchuria as an autonomous Ch'inese province under a German-nomInated Viceroy. 
Sternburg and the Kaiser perceived the offer of a German-nominated viceroy in 
China as an act of confidence and respect toward Germany on the part of the United 
States. In reality, Roosevelt only meant "to brIbe Germany into persuading Russia 
to give up that territory [Manchuria). "27 Germany again tried to secure the 
confidence of the United States by reafflrm'lng the German support of the Open 
Door Policy in 1905. Germany encouraged the United States to send forth another 
circular note to world powers requesting nations not to divide China's territory or 
to seek trade advantages there; on January 10, 1905, Secretary of State Hay 
distr'ibuted such a note. Germany Interpreted the action as an example of joint 
diplomacy executed by the two nations. German Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow 
25 US State Department, .. Neutral1ty of Ch1na1n the War Between Russia and Japan," 310. 
26 Specl< von Sternburg to ThEntlre Roosevelt, 16 February 1904, Thwre Roosevelt papers, 
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indicated this belief in his comments to Sternburg:" It is, ... , the second time 
within ayear, that a confidential agreement between Berlin and Washington has 
proven useful not only for Germany and America, but also for the securing of world 
peace. This fact will also not have escaped President Roosevelt. "26 By the end of 
the Russo-Japanese War, the German government was convinced that the United 
States respected and appreciated a newly developed amicable relationship with 
Germany. The German nation would soon realize during the Moroccan/Algeciras 
incident that such friendly relations were only an illusion. 
Particular comments and actions committed by President Roosevelt during 
the Russo-Japanese War illustrated the lack of respect the American president 
granted the German nation and German political institutions. At the beginning of 
the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt assumed that Germany would act like a 
troublemaker in the Far East. He believed that Germany would most likely use the 
conflict between Russia and Japan to its own advantage, and consequently Germany 
would disturb the balance of power in the region.29 In order to prevent German 
territorial acquisitions in the Far East, Roosevelt attempted to create the illusion 
of German-American harmony. Roosevelt praised the kaiser on several occasions, 
while privately the president considered Kaiser Wilhelm to be both impulsive and 
altogether inept at diplomacy. Yet it is important to note that publicly Roosevelt 
allowed the Germans to take pride in the American praise of their leader. For 
example, after Germany proposed a circular note encouraging the world powers to 
respect China's territorial integrity, the American ambassador to Berlin 
Charlemagne Tower delivered Roosevelt's message to the kaiser. Tower expressed 
"the President's profoLlnd appreciation of his Majesty's glorious initiative and 
28 Ibid., 76-7. 
29 Esthus, 41 , 47. 
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powerful cooperation in the matter of Chinese neutrality. "30 Yet Roosevelt's 
message to British Ambassador Ceci 1Spring-Rice in May 1905 revealed his actual 
opinion of the kaiser. ThIs particular communicatIon also indicated Roosevelt's 
aversion both to authoritarian government and to a German-American alliance: 
But, the German people are too completely under his [Wilhelm II] rule 
for me to be able to dissociate them from him, and he himself is 
altogether too jumpy, too volatile in his policies, too lacking in the power 
of continuous and sustained thought and action for me .... I should never 
dream of counting on his friendship for this country.31 
Friendly relations between the United States and Great Brita'in dur'lng the 
Russo-Japanese War also contributed to the German-American 'Imperialist rivalry. 
Germany hoped to undermine the link between these two nations by informing the 
United States of the alleged British plan both to control the Yangtze River Valley 
in China and to prohibit any foreign commercial interests in the area. In November 
1904, German officials even proposed an official German alliance With the United 
States in order to prevent the British from exerting total control over the Yangtze 
River Valley. Roosevelt refused the German offer by explaining that the American 
Congress would have difficulties accepting such a binding agreement.32 President 
Roosevelt did not plan to weaken the strong bond which existed between the United 
States and Great Britain. In fact, German attempts to break the Anglo-American 
rapprochement only resulted 'in a stronger relationship between the two English­
speaking countries. The paranoid responses which Germany exh'ibited regarding 
this rapprochement reinforced Roosevelt's op'inion that the German kaiser was too 
'impulsive to conduct mature international diplomacy, as well as providing 
30 Jonas. 74. 
31 IbId., 80. 
32 Esthus. 46. 
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Roosevelt with sound reasons to continue developing an amicable relationship with 
Great Britain. 
The Russo-Japanese War influenced the foreign policies of both Germany and 
the United States. The immediate impression for Germany was the perception that 
the United States now acted as an informal ally to the German nation. Germany 
therefore presumed that the United States would support the Germans rather than 
the French during the Algeciras Conference in 1906. The obvious American 
preference for both Great Britain and France during the conference shattered the 
German fantasy. The Russo-Japanese War also influenced American foreign policy. 
The war upheld the Open Door Policy, a critical diplomatic policy for the United 
States during the fIrst part of the twentIeth century. The UnIted States InsIsted 
that China's territory remain intact and that free trade in the Far East be 
protected during the Russo-Japanese War. The United States even cooperated with 
Germany to achieve this end. The success of the Portsmouth Treaty Indirectly 
reaffirmed the Open Door Policy through the treaty's maintenance of China as a 
sovereign and unscathed nation. The international community now recognized and 
respected the United States' Open Door Policy. 
A f'lnal result of the Russo-Japanese War was the new power scheme which 
emerged in the Far East. This balance of power system would remain in place 
through World War I. Nations around the world now understood Japan to be a 
powerful state in the region, while Russia no longer appeared as dominant. Great 
Britain and France continued to exert the'ir influence through the'ir respective 
colonial empires in the Far East, while neither the United States nor Germany 
possessed much more than economic interests there. The power scheme satisfied 
President Roosevelt because no nation appeared to dominate the region. This lack 
of a reigning power thereby safeguarded American economic interests. 
17 
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Morocco (1905-1906) 
Morocco emerged as the next arena for conflict between the United States 
and Germany. The Moroccan incident left no doubt regarding where the United 
States positioned its loyalties in Europe. Participating as a neutral during the 
conflict/ President Roosevelt acknowledged the French/ an ally of Great Britain/ as 
the rightful power in Morocco; his refusal to side with Germany dashed German 
hopes for an alliance with the United States. The controversy over Morocco 
eliminated the chance for a future alliance between the two nations/ and it 
provided yet another catalyst for the escalating German-American competition. 
Once again/ the German-American rift deepened during this imperialist conflict 
due to American ethnic prejudice concerning Germany/ a scarcity of diplomatic and 
pol itical Llnderstanding between the two nations/ and the ongoing German suspicion 
of the Anglo-American rapprochement. The conference also sealed the world 
balance of power system which would eventually explode during World War I. 
France and Germany approached the brink of war on the issue of their 
respective economic and territorial interests in Morocco. The Entente Cordiale 
agreement established an alliance between France and Great Britain in April 1904/ 
significantly influencing German diplomacy.33 German leaders feared that the 
Anglo-French alliance would eliminate German interests around the world/ as well 
as posing a menace to the German Fatherland itself. These leaders decided to 
confront the new all iance on the Moroccan issue in order to cause a ri ft in the 
entente. A breakdown in the all iance between France and Great Britain WOLlld 
serve German interests better both in Europe and around the world/ while 
simLlltaneously removing a powerful threat to the Triple Alliance/ which included 
Germany/ Austria-Hungary/ and Italy. 
33 Ibid., 67. 
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By the end of 1904, France controlled Moroccan customs collection and the 
Tangier police. German leaders naturally objected to the French Moroccan policy, 
since it affected their economic interests in Morocco. Because of the illusion 
created during the Russo-Japanese War, Germany expected American sympathy for 
its plight in Morocco. On March 6, 1905, Ambassador Sternburg asked President 
Roosevelt to tell the Moroccan Sultan that the United States would support 
Morocco in its quest to prevent a French takeover of the Moroccan government. 
Sternburg argued that such a takeover would abolish the Open Door Pol1cy in 
Morocco. To Sternburg's surprise, Roosevelt refused his request based upon the 
fear of French alienation. Kaiser Wilhelm II Visited Tangier on March 31, which 
only resulted in the further provocation of France. During his Visit, the Kaiser 
promised to preserve the rights of Germans in Morocco, informed the French charge 
that Germany would preserve its interests at any cost, and pressured the Sultan to 
ask the international community to hold a conference on the issue of Moroccan 
independence. Both France and Great Britain opposed an international conference. 
Germany signaled throughout the spring and summer of 1905 that the nation would 
declare war if France did not agree to the conference. In response, Great Britain 
indicated her Willingness to ally with France in a war against Germany, as 
dictated by the Entente Cordiale agreement.34 
When Roosevelt realized the gravity of the situation, he began taking steps 
to prevent a European war. Roosevelt feared that war would jeopardize both 
American political neutrality and American economic and trade interests. On June 
14, 1905, Roosevelt met With French Ambassador Jules Jusserand and urged 
France to accept the conference proposal. Roosevelt also indicated during this 
meeting that the United States would support France during the conference. On 
34Ibid" 67-71 J 74-5. 
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-June 27, German Ambassador Speck von Sternburg indicated German trust in the 
UnIted States when he wrote Roosevelt that Germany would be willing to 
cooperate with any American decisions during an international conference; this 
bInding message would damage diplomatic relatIons between the two nations 
during the conference itself. After Roosevelt relayed this message to Jusserand, 
France finally agreed to participate in an international conference in order to 
resolve the Moroccan conflict. Algeclras, Spain was chosen as the site of the 
conference. PresIdent Roosevelt assented to substantial AmerIcan involvement 
during the negotiations.35 
The Algeciras Conference opened in January 1906. The main question during 
the conference was which country would control an organized Moroccan police 
force. Other questions brought up during the conference were Moroccan financial 
reforms and the smuggling of armaments.36 Germany initially refused to accept a 
Moroccan police force administered by France. Throughout the month of January, 
Germany attempted to secure support for its posItion from the United States, 
Italy, Russia, and even Great Britain, yet German efforts encountered little 
success. Both France and Germany continued to reject several peace proposals 
over the next few months, driving President Roosevelt to threaten Germany into 
yielding her position. On March 18, Roosevelt told Sternburg that if the conference 
failed, he would pubIish Sternburg's letter from late June 1905, in which 
Sternburg promised to uphold any American jUdgment during an International 
conference. Roosevelt's threat ultimately destroyed Germany's position during the 
conference because the publication of Sternburg's correspondence would cause the 
German government both international disrespect and humiliation. Conference 
35 Ibid., 76, 82.
 
36 US Stote Deportment, "Morocccm Conference," in Popers Reloting to the Foreign Relotions of the United
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participants finally signed a treaty on Aprll 6, 1906. As a result, France obtained 
the right to joint police administration with Spain in several key Moroccan ports, 
while Germany received minor compensation for its losses. Germany would 
eventually lose all assets in Morocco when France established a protectorate over 
Morocco in 1911-1912.37 Roosevelt's preference for French control of Morocco is 
demonstrated in a passage written by historian Raymond A. Esthus: 
Once the conference met he [Roosevelt] did much to bring about a French 
victory, which in turn removed the danger that the Entente Cordiale might be 
weakened. It is difficult to imagine how he could have given more aid to the 
French during the Algeciras negotiations. Roosevelt forced Germany to 
give way on the Casablanca question at a time when even France's Entente 
partner Britain was ready to compromise.38 
American suspicion of Germany continued to escalate the rivalry between 
the two nations during the Moroccan crisis. Once again, German rhetoric fueled the 
anti-German sentiment which dominated American public opinion. On March 22, 
1905, during a speech delivered in Bremen, Kaiser Wi'lhelm praised German 
nationalism and expansionism. The kaiser emphasized superior German traits, the 
importance of naval growth, and most importantly, a new German world empire. 
"We are the salt of the earth," proclaimed the kaiser; greatness was therefore 
Germany's God-ordained destiny.39 Such rhetoric obviously disturbed the American 
public along with the rest of the world because of the evidence that German 
government officials encouraged worldwide German expansion. 
The kaiser's speech and others like it only raised more questions regarding 
German motives in Morocco, as is demonstrated in several issues of The New york 
Times. One of the first PLlblications of anti-German sentiment during the 
37 Esthus, 90-1 , 104-8, 111.
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Moroccan crisis occurred in December 1905, when an editorial revealed the pro-
French attitude which was popular in the United States. The editorial praised 
French efforts to reI ieve tension with Germany, even though Germany did not 
respond to these peace initiatives. The New york Times quoted that" it is not 
possible to acquit the German Government of the charge of wantonly disturbing the 
peace of Europe. "40 Another fervently anti-German editorial appeared while the 
conference itself was underway in Algeciras in March 1906. The newspaper now 
accused Germany of prolonging the conference in order to benefit the country's 
own ulterior German motives, specifically a capitalization on land acquisition in 
the Middle East. Although the hypothesis is unlikely considering Germany's 
constant advocation for the conference in the spring and SLimmer of 1905, 
Americans still dwelt upon the possibility that Germany only participated in the 
conference in order to acquire land in Palestine. The editorial also claimed that 
. 
Germany could be responsible for the provocation of a European war, and therefore 
the country could no longer expect American support during the conference.41 
American newspapers continued to reveal the widespread suspicion of Germany 
even after the conference's closure. An April 1906 editorial vehemently criticized 
the kaiser's bitter and angry response to the conference, indicating that the kaiser 
might "seriously menace the quiet of Europe. "42 The editorial claimed that the 
kaiser hoped to strengthen Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary and render 
43France and her allies '"a like service on a like occasion· ... Such German 
speeches and actions provoked the American PLlblic to express opposition to a 
40" Disturbing the P~," The New Voris Times, 22 December 1905, 8. 
41 "War Over Morocco Feared By America." The New York Times. 2 March 1906, 1. 
42 "The European Situation I The New vorl< Times! 16 Apri I 1906, 8... 
43 Ibid. 
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German-American alliance; rather, the United States preferred to support France 
and Great Britain during the Moroccan affair. 
Diplomatic and political differences during the Moroccan crisis also 
widened the chasm between the United States and Germany. Although German 
overconfidence contributed to German diplomatic error, the realization that the 
United States was not an ally caused most problems for the country. First, German 
confidence in its own diplomatic finesse hurt the nation during the conference. 
Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow's expansive hopes for German Victory indicate 
Germany's low estimation of French, British, and American cooperative action: 
I felt that I could prevent matters coming to a head, cause Delcasse's 
fall [French Foreign Minister Theophile Delcasse], break the continuity 
of aggressive French policy, knock the continental dagger out of the hands 
of Edward VII and the war group in England, and simultaneously ensure 
peace, preserve German honour, and improve German prestige.44 
Yet, German dependence upon the support of the United States constituted 
Germany's most glaring weakness. Misinterpretation of American diplomacy 
during the Russo-Japanese War led Germany to believe that the United States was 
a reliable ally; the Moroccan crisis and Algeciras Conference shattered this 
'illusion. Diplomatic correspondence between the two nations reinforced this 
notion. Germany attempted to cement the friendship with the United States by 
pointing out the American obligations to protect governmental freedom and the 
open door in Morocco. In an October 28, 1905 telegram to Secretary of State El'ihu 
Root, Germany requested an American presence at the conference in Algeciras to 
resolve the Moroccan issue. In this telegram, the German charge reminded Root of 
the American duty to protect Morocco because of the United States' participation 
in the 1880 Madrid convention,45 By hinting that the United States should defend 
44 Esthus, 68-9.
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Moroccan interests, Germany indirectly requested American support for the 
German position during the conference by referring to Germany's stand as the only 
nation which planned to protect Morocco's territorial and economic integrity. 
According to Germany, France hoped to weaken the governing power of the SUltan, 
while aIso eliminating the interests of other nations in Morocco. 
Germany also used the possible French threat to the Open Door Policy in 
Morocco as a means to persuade the United States to back Germany. Throughout 
the spring of 1905, Germany attested to its desire to maintain the open door in 
Morocco. In fact, Germany pointed out that French control of Morocco would cause 
the end of free trade in the region. On March 6, 1905, when Ambassador Sternburg 
asked Roosevelt to support the Sultan's government, Sternburg hoped to elicit 
American backing by arguing that the United States had a duty to uphold the Open 
Door Policy in Morocco. Roosevelt's refusal to protect the Open Door Policy there 
reveals discrepancies in American foreign pol1cy.46 While the United States 
proclaimed the Open Door Policy to be universally binding in China and the Far 
East, the policy was not nearly so important to safeguard in Morocco. Such a 
contradiction in foreign policy occurred because American 'interests in China were 
vital to the economy, while American 'interests in Morocco were scarce. It is 
important to point out that the Open Door Policy was only a critical component of 
United States diplomacy when the policy concurred with American interests. 
Because cooperation with Germany regarding the Morocco issue risked the 
alienation of Great Britain, the United States chose to reject the Open Door Policy 
argument. British estrangement constituted a greater hazard to the United States 
than the loss of the minimal American 'interests in Morocco. 
46 Esthus, 70, 74. 
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German diplomatic gestures dur'lng the Moroccan conflict generated only 
sharp and critical American responses. Regardless of German attempts to acquire 
American support, the United States always remained on the side of Great Britain 
and France, while simultaneously losing respect for the German government. 
Roosevelt clearly stated his preference for the French in an August 1905 letter to 
Andrew White, the American ambassador to Berlin: "I want to keep on good terms 
with Germany, and if possible to prevent a ruptLlre between Germany and France. 
But my sympathies have at bottom been with France and I suppose will continue 
so. "47 President Roosevelt crushed German hopes for American support in March 
1906 when he threatened to publish Ambassador SternbLlrg's telegram from June 
28,1905. Sternburg's correspondence from that day read: 
The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case during the coming 
conference differences of opinion should arise between France and 
Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you 
should consider to be the most fair and most practica1.48 
The threat to publish Sternburg's telegram forced Germany to yield to the peace 
proposal at the Algeciras conference, even though the proposal favored French 
interests rather than German. Roosevelt's w'll1ingness to humiliate Germany for 
Anglo-French profit indicated to the German government that the United States 
would never side with Germany against the British and the French. Any sort of 
alliance between the United States and Germany was out of the question. 
American newspapers also demonstrated the impact which German 
d'iplomatic maneuvers during the Moroccan incident had upon American public 
opinion. German endeavors to obtain American support and to divide France and 
47 Ibid.• 84-5.
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Great Britain only resulted in a stronger negative estimation of Germany. The 
December 9, 1905 issue of The New York Tjmes indicated American disapproval of 
German aggressiveness. The editorial blamed Germany for its own problems and 
isolation, as well as worldwide unrest: "... there is ... no sign of any 
international trouble except what Germany's own aggressiveness may bring 
about."49 The New york Times also criticized German unreliability. In February 
1906, an editorial suggested that the Algeciras conference might close sooner if 
the German diplomatic corps were more dependable.50 
The Moroccan crisis and its aftermath also reveal German paranoia in 
regards to the developing Anglo-American friendship. German paranoia caused the 
nation to commit actions which the United States did not respect nor condone. 
Germany's first rash action was the kaiser's proposal that Great Britain might 
attempt to annex the Yangtze River Valley in China. The kaiser believed that 
France offered its support to Great Britain for this action in return for 
conciliation on the Moroccan issue, which was why Great Britain seconded France 
in her opposition to an international conference.51 If there was truth to the 
kaiser's speculation about British aims in the Yangtze River Valley, he might have 
succeeded in his attempt to generate a rift between Great Britain and the United 
States; such British expansionism in China would violate the Open Door Policy 
there. However, because there was no truth to the kaiser's accusation, he only 
caused greater American condescension toward German statesmanship. German 
diplomats continued their efforts to divide Great Britain and the United States 
when they pressured President Roosevelt to encourage British acceptance of the 
49" Isolated GermanyI" The New York Times. 9 December 1905, 8. 
50" Algec1ras," The New Yorl< Tjmes, 5 February 1906,8. 
51 Esthus, 71. 
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international conference.52 Germany hoped that if Roosevelt's pressure did not 
result in a conference for the international community, at least it would 
dissociate Great Britain from the United States. However, Roosevelt did not yield 
to German pressure for intervention until he saw the danger of a major European 
war, and such pressure from German high officials only irritated Roosevelt more. 
The New York Times revealed the public reaction to Germany's attempts to destroy 
both the Anglo-American rapprochement and the alliance between France and Great 
Britain. AMarch 1906 editorial on the SUbject is one example. The Times pointed 
out that" Germany seeks to weaken or destroy the entente between France and 
Great Britain. "53 The editorial explained that the German attempts to weaken the 
link between Great Britain and France were also hazardous to the United States 
because Great Britain was an American ally. Once again, Germany failed to 
undermine the developing alliances which were threats to German empire. 
The Algeciras Conference resulted in the destruction of the German hope to 
form an alliance with the United States, the formation of the balance of power 
scheme which would exist until World War I, and the revelation of contradictions 
and hypocrisy existing in United States foreign policy. American support of France 
and Great Britain during the conference showed Germany which nations the United 
States favored. The Moroccan crisis and the subsequent Algeciras Conference 
doomed both German prospects of weakening the Anglo-American rapprochement 
and of forming an alliance with the United States. Rather than improving the 
relationship between Germany and the United States, the conference intensified 
the German-American rivalry; for example, Roosevelt's use of the Sternburg letter 
as blackmail humiliated the German diplomatic corps, creating even more tension 
between the two countries. Not only did the Moroccan crisis contribute to the 
52 Ibid.
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weakened relationship between Germany and the United States, but the crisis also 
strengthened the Entente Cordiale agreement and the European alliances which 
would remain in place until World War I. During the Moroccan crisis, for instance, 
Great Britain showed her wi 11 ingness to go to war on the side of France against 
Germany, in accordance with the agreement signed by the two countries in 1904. 
The Moroccan crisis also instigated German attempts to solidify the Triple 
Alliance as a defense against both the Anglo-French entente and the future 
possibility of British cooperation with Russia. An Associated Press announcement 
from St. Petersburg described the emerging balance of power scheme: 
Great Britain has begun vigorously to press negot1ations for an Anglo­
Russ1an entente, w1th the purpose of completing the triple alliance of 
Great Britain, France, and Russia against Germany, which has long been 
the aim of British policy.54 
The all iance of Great Britain, France, and Russia emerged as a powerful threat to 
the alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. The major powers of the 
world now were aligned evenly against one another. Although the Un1ted States 
did not commit to a formal alliance, the aftermath of the Moroccan crisis revealed 
the American preference for the alliance of Great Britain, France, and Russia. The 
Algeciras Conference also demonstrated the hypocrisy of American diplomacy 
regarding the Open Door Policy. The United States adamantly defended the open 
door only when it suited American interests. For example, the Open Door Policy 
was critical 1n China, where American interests were at stake; however, the 
United States did not deem the Open Door Policy to be significant in Morocco, 
where American interests were minimal. 
Fierce competition took place between the United States and Germany during 
the late 1890s and the early 1900s. While the Spanish-American War and the 
54 .. The European Situation." 8. 
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Samoan Affair previously damaged German-American diplomatic relations, 
imperialism during the early twentieth century caused the disagreement over 
Venezuela in 1902-1903, a brief and illusionary respite from confl1ct during the 
Russo-Japanese War, and a final struggle during the Moroccan crisis of 1905­
1906. These incidents resulted in an antagonistic diplomatic relationship between 
the United States and Germany which would continue until the third year of World 
War I, when the United States formally sided with the Allied Powers and declared 
war on Germany. Factors exacerbating the German-American rivalry were 
American ethnic prejudice toward Germans, a lack of diplomatic understanding and 
communication, and German paranoia of the developing Anglo-American friendship. 
These elements deepened the German-American rift which was rooted in the 
simultaneous hunt for colonies and foreign markets. 
The German-American rivalry at the turn of the century substantially 
influenced the establishment of American 'stepping-stones' to the China market, 
the development of both the Open Door Policy and the Roosevelt Corollary, the 
subsequent American use of the Open Door Policy, and the cementation of the 
balance of power systems in both Asia and Europe. The German loss of the United 
States as a potential ally further isolated the nation in the international 
community. Although Germany maintained amicable relations with Austria­
Hungary and Italy, there is a certain truth to a conception of Germany portrayed in 
The New York Times. The article pointed out the deplorable fact that pre-World 
War I Germany truly was lithe Power that has no friends. "55 
55 "Germany In China." The New Yorl< Times, 12 September 1905,8. 
29 
BIBL IOGRAPHY 
PR IMARY SOURCES: 
"Algec1ras." The New York Tjmes. 5 February 1906. 
"A Pacific Settlement." The New York T'imes. 16 December 1902. 
"Arbitration For Venezuela. JJ The New york Times. 13 December 1902. 
"At War W1th Venezuela." The New York Times. 18 December 1902. 
"Can It Be War?" The New York Times. 3 March 1906. 
"Coercing Venezuela." The New York Times. 5 December 1902. 
"Com'ing To An Agreement. .. The New york Tjmes. 20 December 1902. 
"Disturbing The Peace." The New york Times, 22 December 1905. 
"German Press Anti-American." The New york Times, 17 April 1898. 
"German Ships-Of-War At Man'ila." lhe New york Times. 30 June 1898. 
"Germans Feel Aggr1eved: Consider The'lr Interests In Samoa And 
Phillppines Disregarded." lhe New York limes. 7 May 1899. 
"Germany And The Phil ippines." The New york Times. 18 July 1898. 
"Germany In China." lhe New york limes. 12 September 1905. 
"Germany Is Not Interfering." lhe New york ljmes, 25 September 1898. 
"Germany Not Yet Appeased," The New york Times. 10 Aprll 1899. 
"Germany Veers Around." lhe New York Times. 1May 1898. 
"Germany's Alleged Action." The New York Tjmes, 12 May 1898. 
"Germany's Foreign Policy." lhe New york limes. 1March 1899. 
"Germany's Plans Out lined." The New York Times. 21 December 1902. 
-"Germany's Position." ~ 28 December 1902. 
Hay, John. "Circular Note to the Great Powers, 1900." In Major Problems 
in American Foreign PQlicy. Volume 1: To 1914, ed. Thomas G. 
Paterson. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989. 
Hay, John. "The Open Door Note, 1899." In l'1ajor Problems in Amerjcan 
Forejgn Pol icy, Volume 1; To 1914, ed. Thomas G. Paterson. 
LeXington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989. 
"Isolated Germany." The New york Times. 9 December 1905. 
Kaiser Wilhelm II. "Das Neue Reich." In Stimmen eines Jahrhunderts, 1888­
1990, ed. Andreas Lixl-Purcell. USA: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
Inc., 1990. 
"Kipl'lng Denounces The Anglo-American Alliance." The New york Times. 22 
December 1902. 
"Mr. Roosevelt As Arbitrator." The New york Times. 23 December 1902. 
"No Entangling Alliances." The New york Times. 1February 1903. 
"Rose's Samoa DIspatches." The New Yorl< Times. 11 March 1899. 
"Samoa Treaty Is SIgned. U The New york Tlmes. 3 December 1899. 
"Samoan Outlook Discussed." The New York T1mes. 20 June 1899. 
"Samoan Question In Germany." The New york Times. 14 April 1899. 
"Sign Protocols With Venezuela." The New york Times. 14 February 1903. 
"The British And German Policy." The New York TImes. 12 December 1902. 
"The European SituatIon." The New york Times. 16 April 1906. 
"The German Demand." The New York Times. 13 February 1903. 
"The Germans In Samoa," The New York Times. 1March 1899. 
"The Hague Tribunal." The New york Times. 25 December 1902. 
-"The Only Peaceful way." The New york Tlmes. 10 AprIl 1898. 
US State Department. "Difficulty with Venezuela grOWing out of 
nonpayment of claims ...." Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1904. 
US State Department. "Mr. White to Mr. Day, Berin, May 5, 1898. II Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington 
D.C.: Government PrIntIng OffIce, 1901. 
US State Department. "Moroccan Conference. II papers Relat1ng to the 
Foreign Relations of the Un1ted States. Wash1ngton D.C.: Government 
Pr1nting Office, 1906. 
US State Department. "Neutrality of ChIna 1n the War Between Russia and 
Japan. II papers Relat1ng to the Fore1gn Relations of the United States. 
waShIngton D.C.: Government PrInting OffIce, 1905. 
US State Department. "Samoan Affairs." Papers Relat1ng to the Fore1gn 
Relations of the United States. Wash1ngton D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1901. 
Von Steenburg, Speck to Theodore Roosevelt, 16 February 1904. Theodore 
Rooseyelt papers. ManuscrIpt DIvIsIon, Reference Department, L'Ibrary 
of Congress, Washington D.C., 1969. 
Von Steenburg, Speck to Theodore Roosevelt, 28 June 1905. Theodore 
Roosevelt Papers. Manuscript D1v1sion, Reference Department, L1brary 
of Congress, Washington D.C., 1969. 
"War Over Morocco Feared By America." The New york Tjmes. 2 March 1906. 
SECONDARY SOURCES: 
Beale, Howard K. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rjse of America to World 
power. New York, NY: Co11 ier Books, 1962. 
Collin, Richard H. Theodore Rooseyelt's Carribean: The panama Canal, the 
Monroe Doctr1De. and the LatIn AmerIcan Context. Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louis1ana State University, 1990. 
- ..... 
Esthus, Raymond A. Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rjvalries. 
Waltham, MA: Ginn-Blaisdell, A Xerox Company, 1970. 
Herwig, Holger H. Politics of Frustration: The United States in German 
Nayal Planning, 1889-1941. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 
1976. 
Hunt, Michael. "American Ideology: Visions of National Greatness and 
Racism. II In Imperial Surge: The United States Abroad, the 1890s­
Early 1900s, ed. Thomas G. Paterson and Stephen G. Rabe. LeXington, 
MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1992. 
Jonas, Manfred. The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. 
Kennedy, Paul M. The Samoan Tangle: A StUdy in Anglo-German-American 
Relations, 1878-1900. Ireland: Irish University Press, 1974. 
LaFeber, Walter, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American 
Expansionism, 1860-1898. Ithaca, NY: Corne 11 University Press, 
1963. 
McCormick, Thomas J. "Insular Posessions for the China Market. It In 
Imperial Surge: The United States Abroad, the 1890s-Early 1900s, ed. 
Thomas G. Paterson and Stephen G. Rabe. LeXington, MA: D.C. Heath 
and Company, 1992. 
Parsons, Edward B. "The German-American Crisis of 1902-1903. OJ Ih.e... 
Historian. Phi Alpha Theta, May 1971. 
Paterson, Thomas G. "The Importance of Economic Expansion. II In Major 
Problems in American Foreign Policy, Volume 1: To 1914, ed. Thomas 
G. Paterson. LeXington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989. 
Roosevelt, Theodore. Index to the Theodore Rooseyelt papers. Washington 
D.C.: Manuscript Division, Reference Department, L'ibrary of Congress, 
1969. 
Townsend, Mary Evelyn. The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 
1984-1918. New York, NY: The Macl'1i Ilan Company, 1930. 
